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Summary
Decision makers are often faced with different options and must make decisions
without having perfect knowledge about the outcomes. They have only samples of
data at hand, extracted from past and present states of their environment, that they
must use to generalise and make predictions.
To help them in this process, humans developed in the 19th century an ap-
plication of probability theory commonly referred to as inferential statistics, which
deals with uncertainty inherent to inferences drawn from samples to populations.
However, it is possible that humans were making statistical inferences way before the
formalization of this branch of mathematics and that they possess, as part of their
biological heritage, a set of probability intuitions that help them handle uncertain
situations from infancy onward. It is also possible that such intuitions have deeper
evolutionary roots and that humans’ closest relatives, the nonhuman primates, also
share such reasoning abilities.
These questions have fascinated scientists for several decades and have led to
numerous studies with human adults, human children of various age categories, and
recently, with nonhuman great apes. Findings suggested that human adults are
statistical reasoners depending on how information is presented to them (e.g., nat-
ural frequencies vs. percentages). Research with human children yielded ambiguous
results. Children from 5 years onward and infants seem to incorporate aspects of
probability theory in their inferences. However, research with 3- and 4-years-olds
suggests that they are devoid of probability intuitions. Research with nonhuman
primates suggested that apes also share some probability intuitions that they use to
make predictions from populations to samples.
The aim of my PhD thesis was twofold. First, I aimed to further investig-
ate statistical reasoning abilities in nonhuman primates to shed more light on the
evolutionary origins of this ability and to assess how different presentation formats
affect nonhuman primates’ reasoning abilities. Second, I aimed to shed more light
on the development of probability intuitions during human childhood. In particular,
I wanted to try and uncover why 3- and 4-years-olds were outsmarted by infants in
the same kind of tasks.
In my first study, I tested whether long-tailed macaques, similar to human
children and nonhuman apes, can make predictions from populations of preferred
and dis-preferred food items to samples. I used different conditions to rule out that
subjects rely on quantity heuristics (i.e., comparing absolute quantities of food)
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rather than on proportions of food to make predictions. Results showed that long-
tailed macaques, in contrast to children, apes, and capuchin monkeys (that were
tested later on), do not rely on proportions but rather on heuristics to make infer-
ences from populations to samples. These findings might be taken to suggest that
the ability to draw this kind of inferences evolved in a convergent fashion in New
World monkeys and apes. However, there are still open questions regarding why
long-tailed macaques failed and regarding whether the other tested species really
relied on proportions.
In my second study, I investigated whether long-tailed macaques can extract
statistical information from repeated types of events to make rational decisions under
uncertainty. Subjects were presented with different options associated with different
probabilities of rewards. Subjects could interact several times with each option sep-
arately to learn the different probabilistic patterns of rewards. In a subsequent test
trial, subjects could choose between both options presented simultaneously. Results
revealed that long-tailed macaques extract statistical information from repeated
types of events to make inferences about predictive factors and rational decisions.
These findings suggest that, depending on how information is presented, long-tailed
macaques are statistical reasoners.
In my last study, I tested whether human infants and preschoolers make infer-
ences from populations of preferred and dis-preferred objects to samples, based on
a paradigm already used with both age groups. In my study, however, all objects
in the populations were visible to make sure that subjects could rely on the entire
proportional information. Results showed that neither preschoolers not infants re-
lied on proportions to make inferences. However, it is not clear why infants failed,
as they also failed in a baseline condition in which the outcomes were certain. One
possibility is that infants had no strong preference for any object and therefore chose
at chance. Another possibility is that the procedure confused them even if we kept
it as close as possible to the procedure of previous studies. A last possibility is
that infant’s performance has been over-estimated in previous studies. In fact, it
is possible that in previous studies, parents, who were not blind to the conditions,
interfered with their child’s decisions.
In conclusion, these findings suggest that statistical reasoning is evolutionary
ancient, as different primates species (and bird species) engage in it. However,
there might be more than one cognitive mechanism at play, as long-tailed macaques
succeeded when statistical information could be experienced through repeated types
of events but not when it had to be extracted from the present environment. These
findings also suggest that the ability of infants to rely on proportions of objects
iii SUMMARY
to make inferences about random sampling might have been over-estimated in the
past. In general, more research is necessary to disentangle between different kinds
of probability intuitions and their respective evolutionary origins and to understand
how these intuitions develop during human ontogeny.
Chapter 1
General introduction
“It is remarkable that a science which began with the consideration of
games of chance should have become the most important object of human
knowledge”
- Pierre-Simon Laplace (1812)
“Could there be in a normal man an intuition of probability just as
fundamental and just as frequently used as, say, the intuition of whole
numbers?”
- Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder (1975)
We (humans and other animals) do not know in what precise state our envir-
onment is, nor do we know how events will exactly unfold over time. We have to
guess and base our decisions on these guesses. This is what statistical reasoning is
about. Put simply, it is the ability to make predictions and rational decisions under
uncertainty. But it is also much more, at least for us humans. It helps us in the
process of studying and understanding the world in which we live. What exactly
is uncertainty and how does one make predictions that lead to rational decisions
under it? Is statistical reasoning a pure cultural invention of our species, or is it
a cognitive adaptation for dealing with uncertainty that is present in humans from
infancy onward, and that might be evolutionary older than us? In this dissertation,
I will try to answer some aspects of these questions.
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1.1 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is defined by a lack of information about how things were, are, and will
be. If I stand at my open window and look outside, everything seems to be tinged
with uncertainty. I consider the clouds rapidly moving in the sky and I wonder
whether tomorrow will be sunny. I see the breeze gently rippling the lake and I
ponder over the temperature of its waters. I cast an eye over the empty lawn and
ask myself where my cats are.
Uncertainty becomes a problem when it comes to decision making. Every
living organism capable of self-propelled movement needs to make decisions about
where to go, the moment more than one option is available. Is it going to be left or
right? Up or down? Similarly, every animal needs to select a food patch or a food
element the moment several options are obtainable. River or field, fish or rodent?
The same goes with partner choices or any other kind of choice. Uncertainty about
what choice to make arises when the outcomes of each decision are not exactly
known, either because there is no information about them at all, or because there
is only partial information, in the present or from the past, that might or might not
be useful for a new case. What is the safest option, right or left? Are there any fish
in the river? Is this potential mate going to take good care of its offspring?
Uncertainty can be expressed in different degrees. Still standing at my window,
I cannot say whether I will see the sun tomorrow, or whether the clouds will shade
it from my view. However, not one second will I doubt that, clouds or no clouds,
it will rise above the horizon. I do not know the exact temperature of the lake but
I will definitely refrain from going swimming in it as I guess it is rather cold. My
cats might not be visible, but I could bet a fair amount of money that they are
in a ten kilometer radius of the house. Similarly, one can have different degrees
of uncertainty regarding which decision would lead to higher benefits. Based on
previous information, one might believe that the field is a better option at this
time of the year, as the river is likely to be dried out or that this potential mate is
probably going to disappear as soon as he passed on his genes while this other one
will probably stay longer and invest in his offspring’s upbringing.
Even under uncertainty there seems to be a way to differentiate between what
is more or less probable. Or, in other words, even without knowing exactly what
was, what is, and what will be, it seems possible to ascribe different probabilities to
different states of the world and to different events, which, in turn, might encourage
or hinder some decisions.
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1.2 Of Probabilities and Statistics
What does it mean to ascribe a probability to an event? How can predictions be
made and how can they direct decisions? To answer these questions, we have to
enter the realm of probability theory, inferential statistics, and causality.
1.2.1 Probabilities
Concepts of probability have existed for a long time but the first evidence of their
mathematical formalisation dates back only to the 16th century. Probability theory
made its debut thanks to games of chance. Among its pioneers was the polymath
Girolamo Cardano, who pondered over how mathematics could help solve problems
linked to games of chance. But what is considered to have laid the foundation
of probability theory is a correspondence exchanged in 1654 between the mathem-
aticians Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat.
In the following centuries, probability theory expanded, thanks to the collective
work of many more eminent mathematicians, among whom were James Bernoulli,
Abraham de Moivre, and Pierre-Simon Laplace (see Debnath & Basu, 2015, for more
details on the history of probability theory). Laplace completed what is nowadays
considered as the classical interpretation of probability. The concept of probability
was discussed in examples that detached themselves from lotteries or games with
one or several dice. It was applied to personal decisions, as well as to judicial and
financial ones.
Probability theory had to wait until the 20th century to receive its set of
axioms. These axioms were established by the mathematician Andrey Kolmogorov
in his Foundations of the Theory of Probability (1933). The three axioms suggested
by Kolmogorov are:
1. The probability that an event (denoted by A) occurs is equal to or greater
than zero. It can be denoted by P(A) ≥ 0.
2. The probability that at least one event belonging to the set of all possible
events (denoted by E ) will happen is 1. It can be denoted by P(E ) = 1.
3. If two events are independent, then the probability that both events occur
is equal to the sum of the individual probabilities of both events. It can be
denoted by P(A + B) = P(A) + P(B).
There are five different interpretations of probability that are considered as the
leading views, and all of them respect Kolmogorov’s axioms. These interpretations
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are commonly referred to as the classical, the logical, the subjective, the frequentist,
and the propensity interpretations. It is not in the scope of the present dissertation
to discuss these views, their advantages and their limitations (see Hájek, 2012, for
an elaboration on the different interpretations); however, I will briefly provide an
overview.
According to the classical interpretation, the probability of an event happening
depends on the total number of possible outcomes of equal probability, and on the
proportion of these outcomes that is favourable to the event of interest. For example,
to calculate the probability of obtaining a “6” when tossing a fair dice, one needs to
consider the total number of outcomes that have equal chances of happening when
tossing a fair dice, namely six (all the numbers from 1 to 6), and the number of
possible outcomes favourable to our event of interest, namely one (the dice lands on
“6”). Therefore, the probability of obtaining “6” is 1
6.
According to the logical interpretation of probability, the probability of an
event can also be measured by taking into account all the possible events that can
happen, and by considering those that are in favour of the event of interest and
those that are not. However, this time, the sample space of all possible events that
can happen must not be made of events of equal probability. Instead, each event
can be assigned a different weight depending on the evidence that logically supports
it.
Proponents of the subjective interpretation consider probabilities as degrees
of beliefs made by rational agents. Degrees of belief vary with the information (or
priors) agents already possess and with the evidence. Probabilities as degrees of
belief are updated according to Bayes´ theorem1:
P (H | E) = P (E | H)P (H)
P (E)
In which H refers to the hypothesis whose truth needs to be assessed, and P(H)
stands for the probability of that hypothesis being true, prior to the new evidence. E
stands for the evidence. P(H| E), or posterior probability, stands for the probability
that H is true given the evidence E. P(E| H) stands for the probability of observing
E if H is true, and is called likelihood. P(E) is the marginal probability of the
evidence, averaged over all possible hypotheses.
1Note that Bayes’theorem is not only used to update degrees of beliefs. This theorem is directly
derived from Kolmogorov’s axioms and is a formula to calculate a conditional probability. It can
therefore be applied to all situations in which a probability must be calculated conditional on a
given proposition (see Cosmides & Tooby, 1996, for an elaboration on the topic).
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According to the frequentist interpretation, probabilities are long-term fre-
quencies of events. For example, if one flips a coin one thousand times and it lands
four hundreds times on "head", then the probability of getting a "head" by flipping
that coin is 0.4. For frequentists, a probability is therefore independent from the
human mind and from knowledge. It is a value anchored in the real world.
Proponents of the propensity interpretation regard probabilities as a descrip-
tion of the physical properties of things and of their interaction with the world.
According to this view, if the face of a dice has a 1
6
probability to occur, it is due
to the physical properties of the dice itself. The difference between this view and
the frequentist view is that for proponents of the propensity view, single-events can
also be assigned a probability.
Despite this lack of consensus on what probabilities are, there is an agreement
about how to handle them mathematically, as stated in Kolmogorov’s mathematical
definition of probability (Savage, 1972).
As any other branch of pure mathematics, probability theory provides a the-
oretical framework for the analysis of conceptual or abstract ideas. In his axioms,
Kolmogorov only considers abstract or ideal events that are the result of random pro-
cesses. By random processes Kolmogorov meant processes that produce sequences
of events that cannot be expressed as a function of any shorter sequence but only as
an identity function of itself or as a function of a sequence of the same length (but
see Batanero, Green & Serrano, 1998, for different interpretations of randomness).
In other words, random events are events that cannot be predicted based on pre-
vious information. Each new event is therefore independent from the previous one.
The only known processes that seem to generate random sequences are found at the
quantum level (Calude, Dinneen, Dumitrescu & Svozil, 2010).
But if so, what application does probability theory have in real life, in which
a majority of events are considered precisely not to be random? One of the applic-
ations of probability theory is called inferential statistics.
1.2.2 Inferential statistics
Inferential statistics made its debut in the 19th Century with the work of Francis
Galton and Karl Pearson (Varberg, 1963). It is a form of inductive inference (Savage,
1972), that is to say, it is concerned with drawing generalisations from limited data.
There is uncertainty in this process because inferences go beyond the data given and
there are many possible ways generalisations can be made. Inferential statistics is
often described as the art of making inferences and decisions under uncertainty, as
the study of uncertainty, or as the art of making inferences from samples to pop-
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ulations (see for example Bandyopadhyay & Cherry, 2011; Lindley, 2000; Varberg,
1963).
There are several ways in which inferential statistics has recourse to probability
theory. It is not in the scope of this dissertation to give an account of all these ways.
I will only cover how inferential statistics works (for a detailed account, see Bandy-
opadhyay & Cherry, 2011). Because they are important for understanding what
inferential statistics is, I will also introduce the concepts of statistical regularities,
samples, and sampling processes.
Of statistical regularities
The world is not chaotic randomness, where everything and anything can happen
with equal probability. If you look out of your window, you will not even consider the
possibility that the sun might fall on the ground, transform itself into an elephant
and start dancing the Macarena. Scientists believe that causality creates regularities
with respect to how events follow each other over space and time. Sunsets follow
sunrises in a regular manner. The same type of fruits appears in the same species
of trees. Some individuals spend more time together than other individuals. Lung
cancer develops more often in smokers than in non smokers, etc. These regularities
can be expressed by relative frequencies of events and their covariation patterns
with other events or with different variables (e.g., age, species, smoking habit, etc)
and can be plotted as probability distributions (e.g., the probability of having lung
cancer given different smoking habits).
Regularities can be weak or strong or anything in the middle. Pressing on the
button of the remote control will almost always turn on the television, but a smoker
will not necessarily contract lung cancer. Variability occurs when more than one
causal factor affect a type of event in conjunction, but not all factors are always at
work at the same point in space and time (see Cheng & Lu, 2017, for an elaboration
on this issue). Imagine you follow for fifty years the lives of one hundred humans who
smoke one packet of cigarettes every day. At the end of your survey, some humans
will have contracted lung cancer and some not. This is because smoking alone is not
sufficient to cause lung cancer but works in conjunction with other factors (that can
be genetic or environmental) that were or were not at work in different individuals.
One of the aims of inferential statistics is to inform decision makers. Decisions
makers form hypotheses about the probability distribution of particular parameters
and want to know whether they can act according to these hypotheses or whether
they should modify or discard them. Consider a decision maker who wants to know
whether the following hypothesis is true: the probability of contracting lung cancer
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in humans increases with the frequency of smoking cigarettes. Ideally, she would
collect information about the smoking habits of every human that has ever lived
and about whether they contracted lung cancer. This of course is not possible. Our
decision maker will have to rely on a sample of data, and she will need this sample
to be representative of the population of humans.
Of samples and sampling processes
There are two important factors to consider for a sample to be representative of a
population: sample size, and sampling process. If a sample is too small, it is unlikely
that the measured regularities are representative of the real probability distribution.
The law of large numbers, which comes from probability theory, states that given a
random sampling process, the bigger the sample, the closer the value of the measured
target parameter is to the target population parameter. (Bandyopadhyay & Forster,
2011). For a sample to be representative of a population, it needs to cover the whole
set of possible outcomes (e.g., different degrees of smoking and whether they are
associated with cancer or not) and the probability associated with each outcome.
Imagine a small sample that by chance contains only data about non-smokers and
heavy smokers. This sample would not be representative of the whole population
of humans and would lead to imprecise predictions, because people who smoke one
cigarette a month would be associated with the same probability of getting cancer
than people who smoke two packets of cigarettes a day. Big samples are more likely
to contain the whole set of possible outcomes and their respective probability than
small samples.
The law of large numbers applies to randomly drawn samples. A randomly
drawn sample is a sample that has the same probability as any other sample of being
drawn form the population (Bandyopadhyay & Cherry, 2011). Why is this import-
ant? Imagine that your sample of humans, rather than being randomly selected from
the population, included only construction workers manipulating material contain-
ing asbestos. In this sample, the probability distribution of having lung cancer given
different smoking habits would be flattened, as the probability that non-smokers or
occasional smokers have cancer would increase due to the deleterious effect of asbes-
tos. If the information obtained from this sample was used to generalise to the whole
population, erroneous predictions would be made. By selecting a sample randomly,
alternative factors that can also affect a probability distribution are more likely to
be present with the same frequency with which they are present in the population,
especially if the sample is big.
Let us assume our decision maker obtained a large sample of data that were
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randomly selected. She can now use different statistical methods to test her hypo-
thesis that there is a correlation between increasing frequency of smoking and con-
tracting lung cancer. She could, for example, calculate the probability with which
the observed correlation in her sample, or a more extreme correlation, is sampled if
the true correlation that holds in the population is in fact 0. If the probability she
gets is lower than some criterion, she can decide to reject the null hypothesis and
infer that the true correlation is greater than 0. She could also use Bayes’ theorem
and calculate the probability of her hypothesis being true, given her evidence, or she
could build a mathematical model in which smoking is a factor, and one model in
which smoking is not a factor, and compare which one predicts best the regularities
found in her sample.
Once her assessment is done, our decision maker can use this new knowledge
and decide whether she should stop smoking or not. Note that in my example the
population of reference was a population of several objects (here humans), but a
population can also only refer to one object. Let us assume a decision maker wants
to assess whether a dice is fair. In this case, the population she should consider
refers to all the possible outcomes that can be obtained by tossing this dice.
1.3 Statistical reasoners
In the previous section, we saw what probabilities are, what their mathematical
definition is and how inferential statistics uses probability theory to inform decision
makers. We saw that both probability theory and inferential statistics developed
rather late in the history of humanity. However, this does not in any way mean
that humans did not estimate probabilities and make statistical inferences before
the 16th Century. A question that keeps fascinating scientist is whether the way
humans reason under uncertainty in their everyday lives does incorporate aspects of
probability theory. Are humans statistical reasoners or are inferential statistics and
probability theory only products of human culture? In his Théorie analytique des
probabilités (1812), Laplace wrote a sentence that is commonly translated as:
The theory of probabilities is at bottom nothing but common sense re-
duced to calculus; it enables us to appreciate with exactness that which
accurate minds feel with a sort of instinct for which ofttimes they are
unable to account.
And in fact, many mathematicians of the Enlightenment considered probability
theory to be a description of human judgments (Daston, 1988).
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In the following section, I will provide a short summary of the literature that
investigated whether humans (both adults and children) are statistical reasoners and
whether this ability might be evolutionary ancient and shared with other animals.
Before this, however, it is important to get a more precise idea of what being a
statistical reasoner implies.
Available definitions about what statistical reasoners should be able to do are
rather general. Some examples are “reasoning under uncertainty” (see, for example,
Denison & Xu, 2014), “making inferences that follow Bayes’ theorem” (see, for ex-
ample, Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), or “making inferences from populations to
samples and from samples to populations” (see, for example, Rakoczy et al., 2014;
Xu & Garcia, 2008). There is also variability in the terms used to name the ability
to reason under uncertainty. Some scientists speak of “probabilistic reasoning” (see,
for example, Denison & Xu, 2014; Tecwyn, Denison, Messer & Buchsbaum, 2017),
some others of “intuitive statistics” (see, for example, Eckert, Call, Hermes, Her-
rmann & Rakoczy, 2018; Rakoczy et al., 2014; Xu & Garcia, 2008), and others of
“Bayesian reasoning” (see, for example, Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). All of these
terminologies and definitions seem to imply the ability to use available information
(past and/or present information) to make inferences under uncertainty that are
congruent with probability theory. However, there is no indication about the range
of probability problems statistical reasoners should be able to solve. If a reasoner
complies to probability theory in some situations but not in others, do we call her
a statistical reasoner nonetheless?
What is also not clear in the existing literature is what information statistical
reasoners are expected to use. Inferential statistics, as an application of mathemat-
ics, is content-free: it can work with any information, be it social or physical, more
or less abstract, represented by any kind of symbolic language, as long as it can be
expressed numerically. What about statistical reasoning? In theory it should also
be indifferent to the information it uses. In practice, however, it is limited by the
brain in which it occurs. Each brain is limited by the information it can repres-
ent, be it an event, a hypothesis, or a factor (see, for example, Tenenbaum, Kemp,
Griffiths & Goodman, 2011) and by the information it can integrate (Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995; Marr, 1982), which are, in turn, limited by evolution (Cosmides &
Tooby, 1996). In conclusion, there is rather a general feeling about what a statist-
ical reasoner should be. However, available definitions still provide many degrees of
freedom to researchers who want to investigate statistical reasoning.
INTRODUCTION 10
1.3.1 Are humans statistical reasoners?
Adults
The literature about whether human adults are statistical reasoners is controversial.
It seems that adults were statistical reasoners in the 1960s, lost their ability in the
1970s, and partially regained it in the 1990s.
In the 1960s, Ward Edwards and his colleagues (W. Edwards, 1968; Phillips
& Edwards, 1966) developed the first experiments testing statistical reasoning in
human adults. For example, in Phillips and Edwards (1966), subjects were asked to
imagine 10 bags. A given number of these bags, say r, had a higher proportion of red
chips and the rest a higher proportion of blue chips. Subjects were then shown a bag
that the experimenter had supposedly randomly chosen out of the 10 possibilities.
Subjects therefore had a prior probability of r
10
that this bag had a higher proportion
of red chips and of 10−r
10
that this bag had a higher proportion of blue chips. Subjects
saw the experimenter draw chips out of this bag. Subjects had, after every draw,
to indicate whether they believed that the bag had a higher proportion of red or of
blue chips. Results revealed that subjects did update their belief about which bag
the experimenter had drawn given the sampled chips. However they did so less than
is predicted by Bayes’ theorem. The conclusions of the authors were that adults are
statistical reasoners, albeit conservative ones.
The 70s gave a new turn to the history of statistical reasoners, mainly due to
the joint work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (see, for example, Kahneman
& Tversky, 1972, 1973), whose famous conclusion was that “[man] is not Bayesian at
all” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, p. 450) and “people do not appear to follow the
calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction” (Kahneman & Tversky,
1973, p. 237). From then on, humans adults seemed to be prey to all sorts of
fallacies and to mainly rely on heuristics to make predictions and decisions under
uncertainty. For example, subjects were given the following problem:
Problem 1: Two cab companies operate in a given city, the Blue and the
Green (according to the color of cab they run). 85% of the cabs in the
city are Blue, and the remaining 15% are Green.
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. A witness later
identified the cab as a Green cab. The court tested the witness’ ability
to distinguish between Blue and Green cabs under nighttime visibility
conditions. It found the witness able to identify each color correctly
about 80% of the time , but confusing it with the other color about 20%
of the time.
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What do you think are the chances that the errant cab was indeed Green,
as the witness claimed?
Results showed that most subjects neglected the base rate at which both types of cars
operated in the city as well as the false-positive rate at which the witness identified
the car as a Green cab. Subjects tended to answer 80%, which corresponded to the
probability with which the witness correctly identifies a green car, while the correct
answer was 41% (Bar-Hillel, 1980).
The view that humans rely on heuristics rather than on probabilities when
making decisions under uncertainty predominated during the 80s but it started to
be reexamined in the beginning of the 90s. The idea emerged that the information
format that the brain takes in as input and transforms into an inference might play a
role in how people perform in statistical reasoning tasks. New findings suggested that
natural frequencies are easier to process than percentages (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996;
Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 1999). Other findings indicated that
the representation of the problem rather than the numerical format is of importance.
The representation of the problem can facilitate tasks by helping people imagine all
the possibilities linked to this problem (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi
& Caverni, 1999).
What is not clear from this research is the role education plays in adults’
statistical reasoning abilities. Subjects of these experiments were usually students
who had learnt the basics of probability theory at school. Thus, these findings
are not very informative about the natural state of humans’ statistical reasoning
abilities.
Children
Parallel to research with human adults, researchers also investigated intuitions about
probabilities in human children. The second quote introducing this chapter was
taken from a book by Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder (1975), called “The origins of
the idea of chance in children”. This book summarises years of research with children,
investigating whether humans are intuitive statistical reasoners. Piaget and Inhelder
conducted many experiments to test different aspects of “intuitions of chance”, such
as intuitions about random mixture of objects, intuitions about outcomes of random
drawings, and intuitions about combinatorics. In one experiment, for example,
children were shown a bag containing red and blue marbles and had to predict the
outcomes of random drawings. In the second part of the experiment, the bag was,
unbeknownst to the children, replaced with a bag containing only blue marbles. The
experimenter assessed the children’s level of surprise when they discovered that only
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blue marbles came out of this bag, and whether they understood that there was a
trick or whether they considered it to be normal. The younger children expected
the marbles being drawn out of the bag to follow some kind of order (for example,
first only blue marbles, then only red ones, then blue marbles again), and they
were not really surprised to see in the second part that only blue marbles were
drawn. According to Piaget and Inhelder, this was due to a lack of experience
and of intuitions about probabilities. Some of these young children explained this
unlikely phenomenon by ascribing intentions to the balls (for example “the red ones
don’t want to come out”, or “the blue ones are pushing the red ones”) and the
majority did not conclude that the bag was only filled with blue marbles. Only
older children seemed to update their priors about the proportions of red and blue
marbles of the bag given the evidence. The main conclusion of Piaget and Inhelder
was that children do not possess an intuition of probability from birth. Instead,
they concluded that intuitions develop over time (beginning around 7 years of age)
and depend on knowledge of logical and arithmetical operations.
However, several researchers criticized these experiments, saying that they were
too difficult for children (see, for example, Braine, 1962; Yost, Siegel & Andrews,
1962). In fact, several studies showed that with tasks of reduced difficulty, chil-
dren as young as 5-years-olds, as well as prenumerate adults, make inferences under
uncertainty that are congruent with probability theory (Brainerd, 1981; Fontanari,
Gonzalez, Vallortigara & Girotto, 2014; Pighin, Girotto & Tentori, 2017; Sobel,
Tenenbaum & Gopnik, 2004; Yost et al., 1962).
Infants
In the past two decades, research on probability intuitions reached infants, that is,
children around one year of age or less. Paradigms had to be adapted to be applic-
able to younger children, as younger children would not succeed in making explicit
statistical inferences. Infants were therefore tested with looking-time, violation-of-
expectation, and choice tasks. Findings from this research supported the idea that
infants have intuitions about probabilities that they use to make inferences under
uncertainty.
For example, it was shown that 12-month-olds (N = 20 for each experiment)
look longer when objects of the minority type exit a virtual urn in which several
objects of two different types randomly move (Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez & Bonatti,
2007; Téglás et al., 2011), suggesting that very young children form expectations
about the outcomes of random processes that agree with probability theory.
Others studies showed that infants use these intuitions to make inferences from
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populations of objects to samples and from samples to populations. For example,
in a study by Stephanie Denison and Fei Xu (2014), 12-month-olds (N = 24 for
each experiment) were presented with two transparent buckets containing a mixture
of black and pink lollipops. Before the actual trial, the experimenter assessed the
preference of each child for one of the two lollipops. During the test trial, children
saw the experimenter blindly draw a lollipop from each bucket and hide it in a
cup so that only the stick of the lollipop was apparent. The experimenter then
encouraged the child to crawl towards the cup of her choice. The content of each
bucket was varied so that one bucket always contained a higher proportion of the
favourite lollipops than the other bucket. Different conditions were tested. In some
conditions, the absolute quantity of preferred lollipops was equal in both buckets,
while in others it was higher in the unfavourable bucket. For example, in Experiment
2 there were 16 preferred and 4 non-preferred lollipops in the favourable bucket, and
24 preferred and 96 non-preferred ones in the unfavourable bucket. This composition
of the ratios allowed to control for the possibility that subjects could have relied
on the quantity heuristic: “choose the sample coming from the bucket with more
preferred items”. Results revealed that a significant majority of children crawled
towards the cup containing the sample drawn from the favourable population. This
evidence suggests that infants relied on the proportions of both types of items in
the buckets to make predictions about samples.
In two other studies (Denison, Reed & Xu, 2013; Xu & Garcia, 2008), 4.5-, 6-
and 8-month-olds (N = 16 for each age group, except 8-month-olds, for which no
sample saze was provided) were first shown two boxes containing a mixture of red and
white balls. In one box, there was a higher proportion of red balls and in the other
a higher proportion of white balls. Children then saw the experimenter drawing six
balls out of one of the two boxes, without knowing which one. The sample contained
a majority of one type of balls. The content of the box was then revealed. Six- and
8-month-olds (but not 4.5-month-olds) looked longer when the proportion of the
box did not match the proportion of the sample. These findings suggest that infants
updated their two initial hypotheses about the content of the box in light of the new
data. Additional findings obtained with the same paradigm showed that 11-month-
olds vary their expectation if, prior to the sampling, the experimenter expressed a
preference for a type of ball, and whether she looked inside the box while sampling,
or whether she was blind (Xu & Denison, 2009).
There is also evidence suggesting that infants rely on the relationships between
populations and samples of objects to learn about the properties of objects. For ex-
ample, in a study by Hyowon Gweon, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, and Laura E. Schulz
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(2010) 15-month-olds (N = 15 children per condition) were presented with a trans-
parent box filled with two types of objects, blue and yellow balls. The box was
always filled with 12 visible balls of one type, and 4 of the other type. The experi-
menter drew a number (either one, two or three depending on the condition) of blue
balls out of the box, and each time, squeezed them to make them squeak. Subjects
were then given a yellow ball, and the experimenter recorded how many times they
tried to squeeze the yellow ball. Results were that children squeezed the yellow ball
less frequently if the blue balls sampled out of the box were more likely to have
been sampled intentionally. A plausible reason for why the blue balls were sampled
intentionally is that only the blue balls could squeak. A sample was more likely to
have been sampled intentionally if the likelihood that it was sampled randomly was
low, as in the case in which three blue balls were sampled out of the population with
a higher majority of yellow balls. These findings suggest that infants use outcomes
of sampling processes to assess whether the processes were random or intentional.
They then use this information to decide whether they can generalise the properties
of objects to other objects or not. These findings not only suggest that infants rely
on proportions of objects to make inferences about sampling events, but also that
they use the content and the size of samples to make inferences about the sampling
process.
Preschoolers
Infants seem to be intuitive statistical reasoners, 5-year-olds and older children as
well. What about preschoolers (i.e., 3- and 4-years-olds)? Research on preschoolers
suggest that they do not possess intuitions about probabilities. For example, in a
study by Girotto and Gonzalez (2008), 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, and older children
(sample size very variable depending on age group and experiment) were presented
with a bag in which three objects of the same type and one of a different type were
hidden. Children had to predict which object type was more likely to be drawn
out of the bag. Three- and 4-year-olds, but not older children, failed at making the
correct prediction. Later on, Girotto and his colleagues (2016) applied the same
paradigm used in Denison and Xu (2014) with two populations of preferred and
dis-preferred items to 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 48). In contrast to infants, both 3-
and 4-year-olds performed at chance level in these tasks.
Statistical reasoning to learn about the world
All the examples with children provided above investigated their ability to make in-
ferences from populations of objects to samples and vice versa, and in most examples,
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information about the populations was provided. In real life, however, inferences
about the probability distributions of parameters within a population do not only
apply to the distribution of objects of different types. They also apply to properties
of objects or of individuals that are not perceivable and must therefore be induced
from how these objects or individuals repeatedly interact with their environment.
Several findings suggest that young children rely on statistical regularities
found in samples of events, to make inferences about properties of objects or of
people. For example, in a study by Hyowon Gweon and Laura Schulz (2011), 16-
month-olds (N = 14 per condition) saw one experimenter activate a green toy on
several occasions. On every activation, the toy made some music. The child observed
this while sitting on her parent’s lap. Next to her, lying on a cloth, was a second red
toy. Once the experimenter stopped playing with the toy, she either gave the same
green toy or a yellow toy to the child. In both conditions, the toy did not make any
music if the child tried to activate it. The child then could choose between asking
help from her parent, or reaching towards the red toy. Results revealed that in the
condition in which children were given the green toy, they turned to their parent
for help, whereas in the other condition they tried to reach for the red toy. This
evidence suggests that infants paid attention to the covariation pattern between who
succeeded in activating the toy and the type of toy being played, to infer whether
they were responsible for the toy not activating or whether the toy was not working.
In the first condition, two agents (the experimenter and the child) tried to activate
the same toy, so that the failure at making music covaried with the child. In the
second condition, two agents tried to activate two different toys, so that the failure
covaried with the child and the different toy.
In another study by Anna Waismeyer, Andrew N. Meltzoff and Alison Gopnik
(2015), 24-month-olds (N = 32) observed an adult repeatedly place two different
toys on a device, which then produced music or not. Children were then presented
with both objects and could chose which one they wanted to place on the device.
Results revealed that children took into account the relative frequency at which the
placement of both objects on the device was followed by music in the observational
phase (for example in Experiment 2, the placement of the first object co-occured
with the production of music in 4 occasions out of 4, whereas the placement of the
second object co-occured with the production of music only 4 times out of 12) to
infer which object was more likely to activate the device.
In a study by Elisabeth S. Pasquini, Kathleen H. Corriveau, Melissa Koenig,
and Paul L. Harris (2007), 3- and 4-years-olds (for 3-years-olds: N = 21; for 4-years-
olds: N = 20) were first shown short films in which they saw two adults labelling
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four familiar objects. One of the adults was always more accurate than the other,
but the accuracy of both was varied in different conditions (i.e., 100% vs. 0%, 100%
vs. 25%, 75% vs. 0%, and 75% vs. 25%). Next, children saw films in which both
informants labelled the same unfamiliar object with conflicting names. Children
were then asked to indicated the name of the unfamiliar object. Results showed
that 4-year-olds trusted the more accurate informant in all conditions, whereas 3-
year-olds trusted the more accurate informant only in the conditions in which she
was 100% accurate. These results suggest that at least 4-year-olds rely on relative
frequencies of past events to estimate the probability that an informant is providing
reliable information.
In summary, it seems that from very early on, human children make inferences
that are congruent with probability theory and that allow them to learn about the
structure of their physical and social environment. This ability seem to have evolved
independently from human culture as a powerful tool to deal with uncertainty.
1.3.2 Is statistical reasoning evolutionary ancient?
Findings about the statistical reasoning abilities of humans led to the following
question: “is statistical reasoning evolutionary recent and only found in humans, or
evolutionary ancient and shared with other animals?” (Rakoczy et al., 2014, p.61)
Research from the 1950s and the 1960s suggest that different animal species
(e.g., species of cockroaches, bumblebees, fish, pigeons, rats and monkeys) are “prob-
abilistic learners” (Bitterman, Wodinsky & Candland, 1958; Bullock & Bitterman,
1962; Longo, 1964; Meyer, 1960; Real, 1991; Wilson, Oscar Jr & Bitterman, 1964).
In these studies, individuals were typically presented with two different options on
repeated occasions (usually several hundreds or thousands of trials). One option
was leading to more rewards than the other. Results of these studies indicated
that several species of animals rely on samples of rewarding patterns to direct their
choices under uncertainty. However, the absolute and relative frequencies of rewards
associated to each option were usually confounded in these experiments, making it
impossible to conclude that individuals estimated probabilities.
During the 1980s and afterwards, many studies showed that animals make
optimal decisions by considering prior probability distributions and new observa-
tions in different contexts such as foraging or mate choice (see for example Lima,
1984, 1985, Biernaskie, Walker & Gegear, 2009; for a review see McNamara, Green
& Olsson, 2006, Valone, 2006). However, these studies were based on behavioural
observations rather than on experiments that systematically tested statistical reas-
oning and did not rule out alternative hypotheses. Also, it is hard to compare
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optimal foraging behaviour to the behaviour previously described in human infants.
Are the same cognitive mechanisms involved in all species? Is animal decision mak-
ing under uncertainty also a flexible and domain-general ability that can be used in
never encountered scenarios?
To bring some answers to these question, Hannes Rakoczy and colleagues
(2014) investigated statistical reasoning in apes using a paradigm initially developed
for human infants (Denison & Xu, 2014). Subjects were repeatedly presented with
two transparent buckets containing a mixture of two types of food, a preferred type
and a neutral type. The experimenter simultaneously drew one item out of each
bucket while looking up and presented both fists to the subjects. By pointing to-
wards one of the two hands, subjects received the item hidden inside. To maximize
the probability to receive a preferred food item, subjects had to rely on the different
proportions of food contained in the buckets. Different experiments were used to
rule out that subjects relied on a comparison of absolute quantities rather than of
proportions to make predictions. Overall results from these experiments revealed
that apes, similar to human infants, preferred the sample drawn out of the popula-
tion with a higher proportion of preferred food items. These findings suggest that
some aspects of statistical reasoning are evolutionary ancient and shared at least
with our closest relatives.
Capuchin monkeys were also tested in a paradigm in which they had to make
inferences about the causal properties of two different objects based on information
sampled from repeated interactions between these objects and a device they could
or not activate (B. J. Edwards et al., 2014). Findings suggest that subjects relied
on the frequencies at which the different objects activated the device, together or
separately, to predict which object was more likely to activate the device on its own.
However, this study did not systematically test whether subjects relied on relative
frequencies of activation to make inferences, rather than on absolute frequencies. It
is therefore not clear whether capuchins estimated probabilities and whether non-
human primates in general extract statistical information from repeated types of
events to make inferences under uncertainty.
1.3.3 Open questions
When I started my PhD, an increasing number of findings suggested that children
were smart little scientists who formed theories of the world and updated them
following the laws of probability (Xu & Kushnir, 2013; Xu, Kushnir & Benson, 2012).
Additional findings suggested that intuitions about probabilities were evolutionary
ancient and shared with at least our closest relatives the great apes.
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Nonetheless, there were still many open questions in the literature of statist-
ical reasoning. For example, it seemed that apes shared with human children the
ability to make inferences from populations of objects to samples but what about
other primates? Are all primates statistical reasoners because their last common
ancestor already engaged in statistical reasoning, or is statistical reasoning more
recent and evolved only in the apes’ lineage? And what about statistical reason-
ing that is not constrained to inferences about populations and samples of objects?
There was for example not much information about how nonhuman primates reason
about statistical information extracted from repeated types of events. However, this
ability is crucial to learn about the hidden properties of different social and physical
environments.
There were also still open questions regarding the development of statistical
reasoning during human childhood. More particularly, why were 3- and 4-year-olds
outsmarted by 1-year-olds? Different explanations could account for these findings.
The first one is that the ability of infants was over-estimated and that statistical
reasoning, as concluded by Piaget and Inhelder (Piaget & Inhelder, 1975), only
develops later during childhood. It is possible that infants succeeded in different
tasks by relying on simpler strategies and statistical reasoning occurs only around
5 years of age. A second explanation could be that the ability of 3- and 4-year-
olds have been under-estimated. They were maybe not motivated enough by the
possible rewards. A third explanation is that these findings show the real abilities
of children and statistical reasoning follows a U-shaped curve during development.
More information was necessary to disentangle between these possibilities.
1.4 Aims of PhD
My PhD had two main goals. The first goal was to shed more light on the evolu-
tionary origins of statistical reasoning. For this, I developed two studies testing the
statistical reasoning abilities of long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis), a spe-
cies of Old World monkeys. The shared ancestor between humans and Old World
monkeys dates further back than the ancestor shared between humans and nonhu-
man apes. If Old World monkeys also possess statistical reasoning abilities, it could
indicate that their last common ancestor with apes possessed this ability as well.
My first study (Placì, Eckert, Rakoczy & Fischer, 2018) was based on a
paradigm initially developed for human children (Denison & Xu, 2014), and later
adapted to nonhuman primates (Rakoczy et al., 2014). I aimed to test whether long-
tailed macaques make inferences from populations of objects to samples by relying
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on the proportions of objects in the populations to estimate probabilities of different
outcomes. Monkeys were presented with populations of preferred vs. neutral food
items and had to rely on the proportions of the different food types in order to
increase their chances to choose the sample containing a preferred food item. As in
the previous studies, several conditions were tested to rule out that subjects relied
on quantity heuristics.
In my second study (Placì, Padberg, Rakoczy & Fischer, 2019), I investig-
ated whether long-tailed macaques rely on limited data extracted from repeated
types of events to make rational decisions under uncertainty in more or less complex
scenarios. Monkeys were, in a sampling phase, repeatedly presented with different
options associated with different rewarding patterns. In a subsequent test trial,
monkeys could choose between the two options presented simultaneously. I decon-
founded absolute and relative frequencies of rewards to disentangle whether monkeys
relied on quantity heuristics or on probabilities. The nature of the different options
was also varied to explore the boundaries of this ability. For example, in the first
experiment the two options were two different objects associated with different re-
warding frequencies, whereas in the second and third experiment, the options were
two humans who were more or less good at opening one or two different boxes con-
taining rewards. The third experiment was even more complex. In one condition,
for example, one human was better at opening both boxes than the other human,
but both boxes had the same likelihood to be opened; if monkeys only focused on
the number of food items delivered from both boxes, they would not notice this
difference and would not have a preference for any option. Similarly, in the second
condition, one box delivered more rewards than the other, but both humans opened
boxes at the same frequency. Again, if monkeys only focused on which human
delivered more rewards, they would not succeed in this task.
The second aim of my PhD was to uncover the factors that allow infants to
succeed in tasks in which preschoolers failed. Shedding more light on this could help
understand better how statistical reasoning develops over age, and/or help improve
methods that test statistical reasoning. In my third study (Placì, Fischer & Rakoczy,
submitted), I therefore investigated whether the abilities of 12-month-olds had been
overestimated or whether the ability of 3- and 4-year-olds had been underestimated.
For this I developed a paradigm based on Denison and Xu (2014) in which children
were again presented with two populations of preferred vs. dis-preferred items and
had to make predictions about samples drawn out of these populations. This time,
however, all items in the populations were visible, so as to make sure that children
did not rely on the quantity heuristic: “select the sample coming from the population
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with more visible preferred items” (see Placì et al., 2018; Téglás, Ibanez-Lillo, Costa
& Bonatti, 2015, and Chapter 4 of this dissertation), as this heuristic was not ruled
out in previous studies. I also tried to create a strong preference for one item to
ensure that children remained motivated to solve the tasks. These three studies are
the focus of Chapter 2, 3 and 4.
Chapter 2
Long-tailed macaques (Macaca
fascicularis) can use simple
heuristics but fail at drawing
statistical inferences from
populations to samples
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Abstract
Most statistical problems encountered throughout life require the ability to quantify
probabilities based on proportions. Recent findings on the early ontogeny of this
ability have been mixed: For example, when presented with jars containing preferred
and less preferred items, 12-month-olds, but not 3- and 4-years-olds, seem to rely
on the proportions of objects in the jars to predict the content of samples randomly
drawn out of them. Given these contrasting findings, it remains unclear what the
probabilistic reasoning abilities of young children are and how they develop. In
our study, we addressed this question and tested, with identical methods across
age groups and similar methods to previous studies, whether 12-months-olds and 3-
and 4-years-olds rely on proportions of objects to estimate probabilities of random
sampling events. Results revealed that neither infants nor preschoolers do. While
preschoolers’ performance is in line with previous findings, infants’ performance is
difficult to interpret given their failure in a control condition in which the outcomes
happened with certainty rather than a graded probability. More systematics studies
are needed to explain why infants succeeded in a previous study but failed in our
study.
Keywords: intuitive statistics, probabilistic reasoning, developmental psychology,
intuitive statistics; child cognition
STATISTICAL REASONING IN HUMAN CHILDREN 28
4.1 Introduction
Probability judgments are an important component of rationality as they help people
learn and make decisions under uncertainty. An increasing number of findings sug-
gests that young children have intuitions about probabilities that help them make
predictions about outcomes of random events (Téglás et al., 2007, 2015, 2011). In
addition, these intuitions seem, under some conditions, to help them make rational
decisions under uncertainty (Denison & Xu, 2014). However, within these findings,
there are some contradictions about how children quantify probabilities and about
how these intuitions develop during childhood. In particular, it is not clear whether
young children are able to quantify probabilities based on proportions, an ability
necessary to most probability problems (Bryant & Nunes, 2012).
In a study with 12-month-olds, for example, infants were first shown a pink and
a black lollipop (Denison & Xu, 2014). The experimenter placed both lollipops on
the ground and waited for the infant to crawl to one of them. The item chosen by the
child was considered as her preferred item, and the other item as the less preferred
one. The experimenter then presented two transparent jars containing a mixture of
both types of lollipops to the child. In one jar, there was a higher proportion of
preferred lollipops than in the other jar. The experimenter also brought two opaque
cups that she placed on each side of the jars. She then concealed the content of both
jars with two paper occluders, closed her eyes, reached into the jar on the right,
grabbed a lollipop, and while holding it concealed in her fist so that the stick was
the only thing apparent, she moved it to one of the two cups. She then repeated
the same action with the jar on the left. The experimenter then encouraged the
child to come choose one of the two cups. Several conditions were tested: in some
conditions, the absolute quantity of preferred lollipops was equal in both jars, and in
others, it was higher in the unfavourable jar (i.e. the jar with a higher proportion of
less preferred lollipops). For example, in Experiment 2, there were 16 preferred and
4 less preferred lollipops in the favourable jar, and 24 preferred and 96 less preferred
lollipops in the unfavourable jar. This was important to rule out that children solved
the task by comparing absolute quantities of preferred items in both jars instead of
estimating probabilities based on proportions. Results revealed that more children
than expected by chance moved towards the cup containing the sample drawn out
of the favourable jar and suggest that infants rely on proportions of large quantities
of objects to make inferences about random drawing.
In three similar tasks (Girotto et al., 2016)), one of which was tested with 3-,
4- and 5-year-olds (Study 1), and the two others only with 3-years-olds (Study 2
and 3), 3- and 4-years-olds consistently failed at quantifying probabilities based on
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proportions. Currently, we do not know why 12-months-olds performed better than
3- and 4-years-olds. The main differences between the lollipop study and Study 2 in
Girotto et al. (2016) – which was the most similar in methods to the lollipop study
– were (1) the use of lollipops in one case and of spoons with stickers in the other,
(2) the difference in age between the subjects of both studies, (3) the fact that in
the lollipop study, parents were not blind to the experiment.
One possible explanation could be that the older children were not motivated
enough by the stickers and did therefore not care enough to solve the task. Another
explanation is that the younger children relied on an alternative strategy to solve the
task. For example, infants could have had the illusion that there were always more
preferred lollipops in the favourable jar and could have solved the task by comparing
absolute quantities of visible preferred items. Consider Experiment 2 again. In
the unfavourable jar there were more preferred lollipop than in the favourable jar,
however, it is possible that most of the preferred lollipops of the unfavourable jar
(n = 24) were hidden by the high quantity of less preferred lollipops (n = 96) so
that in appearance more preferred lollipops were seen in the favourable jar. A third
explanation is that infants, instead of solving the task by estimating probabilities,
simply responded to slight cues given by their parents who were not blind to the
conditions.
The current study aimed to shed light on these unsolved questions. Our aim
was to test for the ability to quantify probabilities based on proportions across two
age groups using the exact same methods. We tested 12-month-olds and 3- and 4-
years-olds in a paradigm similar to the one used in Denison & Xu (2014) and Girotto
et al. (2016) to which we made some changes. In our study, the objects were not
stacked one on top of the other in their respective containers. We selected big enough
boxes so that each item could be seen separately and so that children could not solve
the task by comparing absolute quantities of objects. We also changed the nature
of the objects to make them more interesting as potential rewards. Finally, in our
study, parents were blind to all conditions.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Sixty-eight children were included in the final sample, which was split into two age
groups: infants (n = 34, mean age = 12 months, age range = 10-14 months) and
preschoolers (n = 34, mean age = 46 months, age range = 36-54 months). Thirty-
five additional children (thirty-four infants and one preschooler) were tested but not
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kept in the final sample because they either did not make any choice in the preference
test or the test condition (n = 6), or because they did not make the expected choice
in the preference trial (n = 29). Children were recruited from a database of families
who had voluntarily registered and agreed to participate. They were from mixed
socioeconomic backgrounds and some family were plurilingual.
4.2.2 Materials
Objects
Transparent white and transparent blue Kinder eggs were used as stimuli for the
experiment. To all eggs were attached thin wooden sticks of approx. 20cm in
length, that allowed children to see that only one object was removed from each
box and transferred to a cup. On all blue eggs were also stuck white cartoon eyes
to make them more interesting. In addition, all blue eggs contained finger puppets
representing different animals whereas all white eggs were empty (see Fig. S1 of
Appendix C).
Population boxes
Two cubical transparent boxes (length × width × height: 37,8 cm × 39,6 cm ×
18,5 cm) were used as container for the populations of Kinder eggs. Two white
rectangular blankets were used to cover the boxes.
Cups
Two opaque cups (length × width × height: 10 cm × 10 cm × 15 cm ) were used
as containers for the eggs sampled from the boxes. Each cup was covered by a black
tissue with a hole to allow the experimenter to hide the eggs inside.
4.2.3 Procedure and design
Each child was tested individually in a quiet room in presence of a family member.
Children were told they would participate in a game. They sat on the lap of one
parent (except for some 3- and 4-years-olds who preferred to sit alone, with the
parent sitting next to them) who sat on a chair in front of a table. The experimenter
sat on the opposite side of the table. The two cups were already placed on the two
extremities of the table on each side of the child and the experimenter. Parents
were asked to wear opaque glasses that prevented them from seeing the experiment.
They were allowed to withdraw the glasses in between each phase of the experiment.
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Figure 4.1: Procedure. The experimenter presented both boxes of the Probability
condition, one after the other, as depicted in A). She then covered both boxes with
white blankets and while closing her eyes, removed one object in the right box and
hid it in the green cup adjacent to the box, as shown in B). The same was repeated
with the second box. She then took both cups, approached them at equal distance
from the child and encourage the child to choose a cup. The same procedure was
repeated with the Baseline condition.
Each child would undergo a preference test, followed by a probability condition and
a baseline condition (within-subject design).
4.2.4 Preference trial
The experimenter brought from under the table a transparent white egg and, draw-
ing the attention of the children to it, said “Look here, I have a white egg, I open
it. Oh, it is unfortunately empty. See, there is nothing inside”. The experimenter
closed the egg and then brought a blue egg from under the table and said “Look
here, I also have a blue egg, I open it. Oh, there is something inside”. She closed
the blue egg again. Then, always starting with the white egg, she said “Look here”
and slowly hid it in one of the cups, then repeated the same with the blue egg. She
finally lifted both cups simultaneously and presented them at equal distance from
the child who could try and grab the one she preferred. If the child chose the cup
containing the blue egg, the experimenter said: “Oh great, you found the blue egg”.
She opened the egg and allowed the child to play with the finger puppet for some
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time. If the child chose the cup containing the white egg the experimenter said:
“Oh, this egg is unfortunately empty”. Only children who chose the cup containing
the blue egg were kept in the final sample.
4.2.5 Probability condition
The experimenter brought the two covered boxes on the table. One box contained
9 blue eggs and 3 white eggs (favourable population), the other box contained 16
blue eggs and 48 white eggs (unfavourable population). The experimenter uncovered
the first box, always starting with the one on the right (see Figure 4.1). She said
“Look what is in this box” and approached the box towards the child to allow her
to clearly see its content. The experimenter shook the box to make clear that the
eggs could be mixed. The experimenter repeated the same action with the second
box. She then covered the two boxes again and, with her eyes closed, reached in
the box on the right, hid one egg in her hand and placed it in the cup adjacent to
the box. She repeated the same action with the second box. She finally lifted both
cups simultaneously and presented them at equal distance from the child, saying:
“pick the one you want” and waiting for the child to try and grab one cup. If the
child chose the cup containing the blue egg the experimenter said: “Oh great, you
found the blue egg”. She opened the egg, and allowed the child to play with the
finger puppet for some time. If the child chose the cup containing the white egg the
experimenter said: “Oh, this egg is unfortunately empty”.
4.2.6 Baseline condition
The same procedure as in the probability condition was repeated, only this time
one box contained 48 blue eggs (favourable population) and the other box 48 white
eggs (unfavourable population). This condition was added to check whether children
understood the procedure. If children failed in this condition, it could not be due to a
lack of intuitions about probabilities, as the outcome of the drawing was certain. The
side of the favourable sample and of the favourable population was counterbalanced
between the preference trial, the probability condition and the baseline condition.
4.2.7 Coding
Every session was video recorded. Children’s choices were coded from the videos.
Whenever children chose the sample stemming from the favourable population, we
considered it as a success and as a failure when they chose the alternative option.
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4.2.8 Predictions
In the probability condition, we predicted that if children rely on a comparison of
absolute quantities of preferred items to make predictions, they would choose the
sample drawn out of the unfavourable population at above chance level as at this
age, they can discriminate 2:3 ratios (Xu & Arriaga, 2007) and should therefore be
able to distinguish that there are more blue eggs in the unfavourable population.
If they rely on probabilities, we predicted that children would choose the sample
drawn out of the favourable population at above chance level.
4.3 Results
In the baseline condition, 18 out of 31 (58%) infants selected the cup with the sample
drawn out of the favourable population, no different form chance (binomial test, p
= .47; 95% Confidence interval [39,75]). Twenty-four out of 34 (71%) preschoolers
selected the cup with the sample drawn out of the favourable population, signific-
antly different form chance (binomial test, p = .02; 95% Confidence interval [53,85],
see Figure 4.2).
In the probability condition, 17 out of 34 (50%) infants selected the cup with
the sample drawn out of the favourable population, no different form chance (bi-
nomial test, p = 1; 95% Confidence interval [32,68]). Eighteen out of 34 (53%)
preschoolers selected the cup with the sample drawn out of the favourable popu-
lation, no different form chance (binomial test, p = .86; 95% Confidence interval
[35,70], see Figure 4.2).
Among the preschoolers who chose the right sample in the baseline condition,
58% (14 out of 24) also succeeded in the probability condition, no different from
chance (binomial test, p = .54; 95% Confidence interval [37,78]).
To test whether age had an effect on infants’ and preschoolers’ performance,
we did, for each condition and each age category, a post-hoc logistic regression, with
subjects’ choice as response variable and age (in month) as predictor. For this we
used the glm function of the R package lme4. Results showed that age had no effect
in any age category and any condition (Infants in probability condition: Estimate ±
SE = 0.39 ± 0.25, z = 1.52, p = .13; Preschoolers in probability condition: Estimate
± SE = -0.05 ± 0.07, z = -0.70, p = .49; Infants in baseline condition: Estimate ±
SE = 0.23 ± 0.27, z = 0.85, p = .39; Preschoolers in baseline condition: Estimate
± SE = -0.05 ± 0.08, z = -0.70, p = .48)

































Figure 4.2: Percentage of successful children in each condition and each age category.
4.4 Discussion
In summary, we found that in our study, neither 12-months-olds nor 3- and 4-years-
olds selected the favourable sample above chance level in the probability condition,
and only 3- and 4-years-olds did so in the baseline condition. These results sug-
gest that preschoolers did not rely on proportions of objects in the boxes to make
inferences about the samples in the probability condition. We can rule out that
their failure was due to the procedure, as in the baseline condition they selected
the correct cup at above chance level. These results replicate the results of Girotto
et al. (2016). It is nonetheless intriguing that in the baseline condition only 71%
of preschoolers selected the correct cup. This cannot be attributed to a weak pref-
erence for the blue eggs, as only one preschooler out of 35 did not choose the cup
containing the blue egg in the preference test (and was therefore not included in
the final sample). It seems that something in the procedure confused some children.
This confusing factor could have been the experimenter performing the drawing.
In Study 3 of Girotto et al. (2016), the drawing was performed by a machine and
children’s performance in a condition similar to our baseline condition was better
(90% success) than in Study 2 of Girotto et al. (2016; 69% success) and better than
in our baseline condition, in which the experimenter did the drawing. Maybe some
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children expected some sort of trick to be played on them and did therefore not
consider the outcome of the drawing to be certain.
One could wonder whether there was a subsample of children who were not
confused by the procedure and who performed well in the probability condition. This
does not seem to have been the case, as only 58% of the children who performed
well in the baseline condition also performed well in the probability condition.
Our findings also indicate that infants did not rely on the proportions of objects
in the boxes to make inferences about the samples in the probability condition (i.e.,
did not preferentially choose the sample drawn out of the box with more preferred
items). However, this is not surprising given that infants in this procedure seem not
to have relied on any numerical information at all as indicated in the fact that they
also performed at chance level in the baseline condition. A possible explanation for
infants’ failure in both conditions is that they did not have a strong preference for
the blue eggs. In fact, almost half of the infants tested in the preference trial (28
infants out of 62) did not select the cup containing the blue egg and where therefore
excluded from the final sample. Maybe, rather than having selected a sample of
children with a preference for the blue eggs, we selected a sample of children who
chose randomly between both egg colours. It is hard to explain why infants would
not have a strong preference for an egg with cartoon eyes that visibly contains
something when the alternative is an empty egg without eyes. In Denison & Xu
(2014), it is not clear whether infants had a strong preference for any lollipop, as the
only indicator for such preference is their good performance in the test trials. With
only one preference trial it is in fact difficult to distinguish between a preference
for an object and a random choice, especially if half of the subjects select one
object and half select the alternative. It is also worth noting that there was a
difference between our preference trial and the one in Denison & Xu (2014). In our
preference trial, we placed the objects in the cups instead of placing them visibly in
front of the children. Children therefore had to keep track of the location of both
eggs. However, as infants are able to retrieve hidden objects from 8-months onward
(Munakata, McClelland, Johnson & Siegler, 1997) and to find different objects in
different locations (Feigenson & Halberda, 2004), this should not explain why only
half of the infants in our preference trial chose the cup containing the blue egg.
Another difference between our experiment and the experiments in Denison
& Xu (2014) is that in our case, parents could not have influenced their child’s
behaviour, as they were blind to the experiment. In Denison & Xu (2014) parents
were not blind. Even if parents were asked not to interfere with the task, they might
have done so inadvertently. It is therefore still not possible to distinguish whether
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infants performed well in Denison & Xu (2014) because they received help from
their parents, or whether infants performed poorly in our study because they did
not have any preference for any object. More studies are necessary to disentangle
between these possibilities. Future studies should assess children’s preferences with
several preference trials and should make sure that parents cannot interfere with
their child’s decisions. It is also worth asking whether this paradigm does need any
other further improvement, considering the all-but-perfect performance of children
in the baseline condition. It seems that there is something in the procedure that
adds noise to the data and that is independent of children’s ability to estimate
probabilities.
In summary, the present study failed to find evidence that preschoolers rely
on proportions of objects to make inferences about sampling events. These findings
are congruent with previous results (Girotto et al., 2016). The present study also
failed to find evidence for intuitive statistical inferences in infants, but these findings
remain difficult to interpret in light of infants’ failure in the non-probabilistic baseline
condition. Our study also highlights the importance of improving this paradigm,
both for its use with infants and older children, if we want to come to a better
understanding of children’s probabilistic reasoning abilities.
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
The aims of my PhD were to investigate the evolutionary origins of statistical reas-
oning and to shed more light on the developmental trajectory of intuitions about
probabilities in human children. Based on the results of my studies and on results
from other studies, including studies published after I started my PhD, I will discuss
what these findings tell us about the two main questions of my dissertation. I will
also discuss potential improvements that could be made in the field of comparative
and developmental psychology to further investigate statistical reasoning.
5.1 Evolutionary origins of statistical reasoning
5.1.1 Reasoning about populations of objects and samples
In my first study, I investigated whether long-tailed macaques rely on cues of ran-
dom sampling and on proportions of objects to make inferences from populations
to samples. I included different conditions to rule out that subjects did not rely
on quantity heuristics. Results were that long-tailed macaques, unlike human in-
fants (Denison & Xu, 2014), apes (Eckert, Call et al., 2018; Rakoczy et al., 2014),
capuchin monkeys (Tecwyn et al., 2017), and one parrot (Clements, Gray, Gross
& Pepperberg, 2018), failed at making inferences from populations to samples that
were congruent with probability theory. These findings suggest that statistical reas-
oning might have evolved in convergent fashion in New World monkeys, apes and
birds. Before drawing hasty conclusions about the evolutionary origins of statistical
reasoning, however, we need to clarify some points.
The first point is whether long-tailed macaques’ poor performance signifies
that they lack intuitions about probabilities. It does not necessarily. There might
be a difference between long-tailed macaques and the other tested species in how
they solved these tasks, as long-tailed macaques performed worse than the other
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species. However, it needs not be a difference in statistical reasoning abilities. To
be successful in the different tasks presented in Denison and Xu (2014), in Rakoczy
et al. (2014), in Tecwyn et al. (2017), and in Placì et al. (2018), individuals had
to be able to represent the sample space, that is, the food items contained in the
population and their respective probability of being drawn. The actual proportions
of food were only informative under the assumption that all items in the population
could be sampled with the same probability. This in turn, should only be assumed
if the sampling was random. This assumption should have been made based on the
behaviour of the experimenter who closed her eyes or looked up while selecting items
in the populations of food, and who therefore was blind to what she was drawing –
a good indication for unbiased sampling. Long-tailed macaques could have failed at
representing the proportions of food as the sample space because of the high salience
of food. Using food as numerical information and as reward does in fact lower the
performance of long-tailed macaques in quantity discrimination tasks (Schmitt &
Fischer, 2011). However, this is also the case for human children (Carlson, Davis &
Leach, 2005) and apes (Boysen & Berntson, 1995), so this explanation alone cannot
account for why long-tailed macaques performed worse than the other species. Long-
tailed macaques could also have failed in these tasks because they did not consider
the experimenter to be blind to the sampling, either due to a lack of perspective
taking – at which long-tailed macaques tend to fail, at least with humans partners
(Kummer, Anzenberger & Hemelrijk, 1996) – or to a belief that the experimenter
haptically distinguish between both food types, which was actually true. Moreover,
the fact that two individuals within the group of long-tailed macaques were consist-
ently good across the different conditions suggests that solving these tasks is not
out of reach for animals of this species.
A second point that needs to be addressed is what a good performance in these
tasks actually implies. Does a good performance clearly indicate inferences that are
congruent with probability theory? If all conditions necessary to rule out reliance on
different quantity heuristics are tested, a good performance across conditions would
be a good indicator of intuitions about probabilities. This was, however, neither the
case in studies with human infants (Denison & Xu, 2014), apes (Eckert, Call et al.,
2018; Rakoczy et al., 2014), and capuchin monkeys (Tecwyn et al., 2017) nor in the
study with the parrot (Clements et al., 2018). In the capuchin study, individuals
did not perform above chance level in the condition meant to rule out that subjects
relied on the heuristic: “avoid the sample drawn out of the population with more
dis-preferred items”. In the children study, the methods of the experiments meant to
rule out this quantity heuristic are ambiguous. In these experiments (Experiment 3
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and 4), the authors made the assumption that a third type of object (green lollipops)
inserted in the populations was considered as neutral by the children because they
did not encounter it in the preference trial. If this was the case, results indicate that
children did not try to avoid the sample drawn out of the population with more dis-
preferred food. However, in case this assumption was not warranted, results would
indicate the contrary. In the parrot study, no conditions were tested to rule out the
use of quantity heuristics. Furthermore, as in all studies (except the parrot study)
items were stacked on top of each other in the presented populations, subjects could
have had the illusion that there were always more preferred items in the favourable
population and could have relied on a comparison of absolute quantities of visible
preferred items to solve the task. In no other study except ours were there any
conditions that ruled out that individuals based their inferences on a comparison
of visible preferred food items. Finally, as shown in a study with older children
(Falk, Yudilevich-Assouline & Elstein, 2012), it is possible that individuals rely on
different quantity heuristics interchangeably. This strategy would allow them to
solve most tasks but does not require intuitions about probabilities. Looking at
individual performance in the nonhuman primates studies, we see that there are
only few subjects who were consistently good across all conditions, which could
indicate that individuals used a mixture of different heuristics to solve the tasks.
It must also be noted that this paradigm in itself is not sufficient to provide
answers about statistical reasoning abilities, as it only focused on inferences from
populations to samples. However, there are other studies indicating that children
are proficient in other aspects of statistical reasoning. For example, infants take into
account the sampling process to form expectations about populations of objects and
samples (Xu & Denison, 2009). They use samples to make inferences about sampling
processes, which they in turn use to make generalisations about the properties of the
samples (Gweon et al., 2010). They expect samples to be representative of popula-
tions (Xu & Garcia, 2008). These studies did, however, not consistently investigate
whether individuals’ expectations were shaped by the probabilities of different out-
comes, or whether they relied on heuristics. Similarly, chimpanzees consider whether
a sampling process is intentional or blind to form expectations about samples drawn
out of populations (Eckert, Rakoczy, Call, Herrmann & Hanus, 2018). Apes also
expect populations to be representative of samples (Eckert, Rakoczy & Call, 2017).
However, it seems that these expectations are not based on a estimation of probab-
ilities but rely on quantity heuristics.
Finally, these findings leave open some interesting questions regarding the
usage of statistical reasoning abilities in everyday life scenarios. Reasoning about
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random processes and making inferences from populations of objects to samples
drawn out of them and vice versa is an ability that can help with making rational
decisions in games of chance, for example, but no animals other than humans enjoy
spending time in casinos or playing lotteries. Outside of games of chance, it is
difficult to imagine a scenario involving random drawing and access to complete
information about populations. In fact, in real life scenarios, information about
populations is rarely obtainable. This is the reason why statistical reasoning is
needed in the first place. Uncertainty usually stems from the need to rely on samples
of data to learn about hidden properties of the environment. Is this tree producing
good fruits? Is this individual cooperative? Is this pill creating headaches? One
must rely on repeated interactions between organisms and their environment, to
infer the state of these hidden properties. There are studies showing that infants,
macaques, capuchin monkeys, and apes rely on statistical regularities of repeated
types of events to make inferences about hidden properties of people or of objects
(B. J. Edwards et al., 2014; Gweon & Schulz, 2011; Meyer, 1960; Völter, Sentís &
Call, 2016; Waismeyer et al., 2015), however in these studies, absolute and relative
frequencies of types of events are not disentangled, it is thus not clear whether
subjects relied on heuristics or whether they estimated probabilities.
In summary, with the current evidence, we can conclude that some important
aspects of statistical reasoning seem to be evolutionary ancient, such as considering
the sampling process to make inferences from populations to samples and expecting
samples to be representative of populations. There is evidence that children, apes,
capuchin monkeys and a parrot rely on proportions of objects to make inferences
from populations of objects to samples, but more research testing alternative hypo-
theses is needed. It is also not clear whether long-tailed macaques failed at making
inferences from populations to samples because of a lack of probability intuitions
or due to extraneous factors. Alternative methods that do not use food to convey
numerical information nor humans as random processes should be developed, to
reduce the demands of the tasks extraneous to statistical reasoning. This could in
turn serve to increase the range of species that can be tested. What should also be
investigated is how reasoning from populations of objects to samples and vice versa
is extendable to reasoning about events.
5.1.2 Reasoning about repeated types of events
In my second study, I investigated whether long-tailed macaques rely on relative
frequencies of repeated events to make rational decisions under uncertainty and I
included different conditions to rule out that they rely on quantity heuristics. The
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results of this study show a different picture of the statistical reasoning abilities of
long-tailed macaques. In Experiment 1, it seems that long-tailed macaques mon-
itored the different rewarding frequencies associated with different objects to predict
which objects were leading to more probable rewards. We could rule out that mon-
keys based their choices on a mere comparison of absolute frequencies. Instead, our
findings indicate that they compared relative frequencies, and therefore probabil-
ities, to make predictions. They used these predictions to make rational decisions
when several options were available simultaneously. Moreover, it seems that long-
tailed macaques did not make predictions based solely on the relative frequencies
of rewards associated with each option but also on the amount of information that
was available for each option. Sample size therefore seems to matter to long-tailed
macaques. Results of Experiment 2 and 3 further suggest that long-tailed macaques
can monitor events of different levels of complexity and keep track of more complex
covariation patterns to disentangle between factors that are relevant for their pre-
dictions and factors that are not, independent of whether these factors are social
or physical. However, either the complexity of the event itself, or the nature of the
different factors slowed down monkeys’ learning process.
These findings raise some questions about statistical reasoning based on re-
peated types of events. The first question is whether what we call statistical reas-
oning here is actually only the result of associative learning with different schedules
of reinforcement (Ferster & Skinner, 1957) or whether it truly results from a com-
parison of different probabilities of rewards. In Exp. 1a, 1b and 1c, monkeys’
performance reached ceiling, which indicates that they made optimal choices based
on probabilities, rather than engaged in probabilistic matching based on the dif-
ferent reinforcement schedules. Probabilistic matching was documented in many
species, including fish (Behrend & Bitterman, 1961), pigeons (Bullock & Bitter-
man, 1962), rats (Hickson, 1961), rhesus monkeys (Wilson et al., 1964) and human
children (Yost et al., 1962). However under different circumstances, rats, monkeys,
children, and pigeons, also engage in optimal decisions (Meyer, 1960; Parducci &
Polt, 1958; Roberts, MacDonald & Lo, 2018; Yost et al., 1962). It could be that
rather than responding to reinforcement, individuals sometimes rely on win-stay,
loose-switch strategies, which eventually leads to probabilistic matching, and some-
times they rely on probabilities. This seems to have been the case with long-tailed
macaques in our experiments and was also discussed in Wilson et al. (1964) as a
possible behaviour for rhesus macaques and rats. Nonetheless, in the future, to
completely rule out associative learning processes, one should develop a set of tasks
in which the reinforcement schedules associated with different options are the same,
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but the probabilities of rewards differ.
A second question raised by the findings of my second study refers to the
role mental representations and levels of abstractions play in statistical reasoning.
For example, in Experiments 2 and 3, the probability associated with each option
were the probability that each agent managed to open the box containing rewards.
However, what one saw were two agents performing exactly the same behaviour,
i.e., reaching towards the box, that resulted in different outcomes, i.e., the box
opening or not. If one cannot represent agents as being more or less proficient at
opening boxes, and boxes as being more or less easy to open, the task becomes
much harder. In fact, in this case one has to remember all occasions on which
agent A reached towards the box, and whether the box opened or not rather than
remembering: “Agent A was successful 100% of the time, agent B only 40%”. In
other words, rather than compressing one event into one datum such as:“the agent
was successful”, one has to remember two data such as: “the agent reached towards
the box; the box opened”. The same task can therefore be more or less demanding for
different species, depending on the mental representations individuals possess rather
than depending on their intuitions about probabilities. It is therefore possible that
when we compare performance in statistical reasoning between species, we actually
compare species with different levels of abstractions rather than species with different
levels of intuitions about probabilities. It is also possible that mental representations
affect the domains in which statistical reasoning can be applied.
In summary, the findings from my second study suggest that long-tailed macaques
are statistical reasoners when provided with sequential events as information input.
These findings also suggest that statistical reasoning might have been present in the
last common ancestor of New World monkeys, Old world monkeys and apes after
all, and might even be more evolutionary ancient, as parrots and pigeons (Roberts
et al., 2018) recently tested in a similar paradigm as in my second study, also share
this ability. The statistical reasoning ability of long-tailed macaques highlighted in
my second study is also easier to extend to real life decision-making under uncer-
tainty. Long-tailed macaques seem to possess a powerful cognitive mechanism to
learn about their physical and social environment, that might only be restricted by
the kind of abstract representations monkeys have.
5.1.3 Differences between different types of reasoning
In both my first and second study, long-tailed macaques had to choose between two
options associated with different probabilities of reward. However, what is not clear
is whether the cognitive mechanisms required to make rational decisions in the first
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study are the same as the mechanisms required to make rational decisions in the
second study. In a recent study by Roberts et al. (2018), pigeons were tested in
tasks that were similar to Experiment 1 of my second study. Subjects could peck
two different keys associated with different probabilities of reward, and from time to
time, both keys were available simultaneously, so that subjects had to make a choice
between both. Different conditions ruled out that pigeons relied on a comparison of
absolute quantities of events rather than on relative frequencies. The authors in this
study compare this ability to the abilities of children in Denison and Xu (2014), of
apes in Rakoczy et al. (2014), and of capuchins in Tecwyn et al. (2017). Findings of
my first and second study suggest that there might be different cognitive mechanisms
at play, as the same group of long-tailed macaques did not perform at similar levels
in both studies. However, as the performance of long-tailed macaques could have
been hindered in the first study by factors extraneous to statistical reasoning, the
difference in performance between my first two studies alone is not sufficient to infer
that different mechanisms are at play.
Aside from differences in the kind of uncertainty that has to be dealt with
in both kind of tasks (i.e., uncertainty inherent to random processes vs. uncer-
tainty inherent to inductive inferences), there is another noteworthy difference: in
the first study, subjects had to make inferences about single event probabilities, that
is, probabilities that they had never experience before, whereas in the second study,
subjects had to make inferences about experienced contingencies. In the first study,
statistical information had to be extracted from the present state of the environ-
ment. In the second study, information had to be extracted from repeated types of
events, inferences therefore relied on information from past events that individual
had experienced. Research on statistical reasoning in human adults showed that
subjects are better at making inferences when they experienced events compared to
when they were provided with symbolic descriptions of problems (Bar-Hillel, 1980;
Phillips & Edwards, 1966; Rehder & Waldmann, 2017). This suggests that exper-
ience can facilitate reasoning in some contexts (see Hertwig, Hogarth & Lejarraga,
2018, for an elaboration).
In Experiments 3 and 4 of Téglás et al. (2007), the relation between probability
intuitions based on present information and on past frequencies was assessed. Three-
and 5-year-olds saw short films of a ball randomly moving inside a rectangular box
that had one opening on one side and three openings on the other side. After several
seconds, the content of the box was occluded, and children were asked to press a
button as soon as they saw the ball exit from one of the holes. Children underwent
several sessions in which they experienced that the ball came more frequently out of
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one opening rather than the three openings. Based on the present state of the envir-
onment, children should thus have had a prior belief that the ball would come out of
one of the three openings (expected openings). Their reaction times of pressing the
button were consistent with this hypothesis, as children were quicker when the ball
came out of one of the expected openings than when it came out of the unexpected
opening. However, across sessions, this prior belief should be updated based on
the experienced frequencies. Reaction times of 5-year-olds changed across sessions,
children became quicker when the ball came out of previously unexpected opening.
This was not the case for 3-year-olds. They did not update their priors based on the
experienced evidence. The authors concluded that: “far from being the foundation
of probabilistic reasoning, experienced frequency moulds the expectation of future
events only at a late stage of development” and “it looks like perceived frequen-
cies and explicit reasoning about future states of affairs are computed by different
mechanisms”.
It is surprising that three-year-olds do not learn from experienced frequencies,
whereas 1-year-old long-tailed macaques and pigeons do. But actually, what Téglás
et al. (2007) compared in their study were not probability estimations based on
present information to estimations based on experienced frequencies. What they
assessed was whether children updated their priors based on new evidence. It is
possible that 3-year-olds do learn from experienced frequencies when their priors
are flat, as do long-tailed macaques, but that they have difficulties updating their
priors if they are not flat. These findings could therefore also indicate that both
kinds of intuitions are present in children from birth and are evolutionary ancient,
but that the ability to update prior beliefs based on new information might emerge
later during development. Nonetheless, results from Téglás et al. (2007) suggest that
there are different cognitive mechanisms that are involved in assessing probabilities
of uncertain events.
In summary, findings from my first and second study, as well as recent find-
ings with apes, capuchins, parrots, and pigeons, suggest that statistical reasoning
is evolutionary ancient. Different cognitive mechanisms could be at the origins of
probability intuitions and they might have followed different evolutionary traject-
ories. The ability to make inductive inferences from samples of experienced events
might have already been present in the last common ancestor between birds and
mammals, some 300 million years ago (Burt et al., 1999), or might have evolved
in convergent fashion in birds and primates. However, the ability to make predic-
tions from populations of objects to samples might only have evolved in New World
monkeys, Apes and birds, but more studies are needed to confirm this.
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5.2 Of smart babies and dumb preschoolers
In my third study I investigated whether the performance of infants and preschool-
ers at making inferences from populations of objects to samples by relying on pro-
portions of objects had been respectively over-estimated and under-estimated in
previous studies. Results of my third study showed that preschoolers do not rely
on proportions of objects to make predictions from populations to samples, as was
already suggested by previous research (Girotto et al., 2016). Our results with in-
fants are harder to interpret, as subjects also failed in the baseline condition, in
which outcomes were certain. There are two explanations for this: either the pro-
cedure confused them or they did not have a strong preference for one of the objects.
It is unclear why they would be confused by the procedure, as we tried to keep it as
close as possible to the procedure used in Denison and Xu (2014) in which infants
were successful. It is also unclear why they would have a preference for one lollipop
over another due to different colours, but not for a blue egg with cartoon eyes con-
taining something over a white egg without eyes and content. Another possibility is
that the performance of infants in Denison and Xu (2014) has been over-estimated
and that subjects, instead of estimating probabilities, based their choices on slight
indications from their parents who were not blind to the conditions. This last pos-
sibility is in line with the findings of Téglás et al. (2015), namely that infants are
able to estimate probabilities of events in an extensional way but not by relying on
proportions of large quantities of objects.
There are other findings that suggest that infants rely on proportions of objects
to estimate probabilities of random drawing. For example, in Xu and Garcia (2008)
infants expected samples drawn out of hidden populations of objects to be repres-
entative of the populations in terms of their proportions of red and white objects.
In Gweon et al. (2010) infants relied on the probability of obtaining a given sample
drawn out of a population of objects to assess whether the drawing was intentional
or not. However, in these studies nothing ruled out that children relied on quantity
heuristics to make predictions.
Infants seem to be intuitive statisticians insofar as they consider cues of in-
tentional or random drawing to make predictions, as they expect samples to be
representative of populations, and as they make inferences about sampling process
based on evidence. Whether they rely on proportions of objects to assess probab-
ilities of random drawing is yet not clear. It is possible that infants’ performance
has been overestimated and that they rely on a series of quantity heuristics to make
predictions about random drawing when they cannot estimate probabilities in an
extensional way. With age, however, children develop their understanding of ran-
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dom drawing, random distributions and combinatorics, and rely less and less on
heuristics, as suggested by the work of Falk et al. (2012) and Piaget and Inhelder
(1975). More studies are needed in which the preference of children for different
object types is assesses with more care, and in which parents are blind to the exper-
iments to shed more light on the developmental trajectory of probability intuitions.
What also remains unclear is how this relates to children’s abilities to reason about
repeated types of events. Findings of Gweon and Schulz (2011) and Waismeyer et al.
(2015) suggest that infants consider covariation patterns and relative frequencies of
types of events to make predictions. However, these studies did not systematically
rule out that children relied on quantity heuristics rather than probabilities.
In summary, findings from many different studies suggest that human infants
are statistical reasoners, as they seem able to make inferences from populations to
samples and from samples to populations taking sampling processes and sample
sizes into account. However, more studies are necessary to assess whether children
rely on an estimation of different probabilities of outcomes, or whether they rely
on quantity heuristics to make predictions about random drawing. It could be that
this ability only emerges later during childhood.
5.3 Future perspectives
As in any other field of research, there is room for improvement in research about
statistical reasoning. More species should be studied to obtain a clearer picture of
the evolutionary origins of this ability. Studies should include conditions that rule
out the use of all possible heuristics. This has not been done carefully enough in
the past. The demands of the tasks extraneous to statistical reasoning should be
reduced to a minimum to avoid their interference with subjects’ performance. Most
importantly, in my opinion, more thoughts should be given to the nature of statistical
reasoning. Are we talking of one or of several mechanisms? What is the difference
between the different terms used to refer to the ability to make predictions under
uncertainty, such as probabilistic reasoning, intuitive statistic, statistical reasoning,
Bayesian reasoning? What are the requirements to call an individual, or a group
of individuals, statistical reasoners? What role do mental representations play in
statistical reasoning?
5.3.1 Definitions
A good start to answer some of these questions would be to provide more precise
definitions based on probability and inferential statistics theory. As mentioned in
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the introduction of this dissertation, probability theory provides mathematical tools
to compute probabilities of outcomes of random processes. The uncertainty that is
dealt with in probabilistic experiments is inherent to random processes, as no previ-
ous information indicates what is going to happen. Outcomes of random processes
are estimated based on the sample space and on the probability associated with each
type of outcomes.
Inferential statistics deals with uncertainty that is inherent to inductive in-
ferences, that is, to generalisations made from samples of data. Randomness here
comes into play at the moment of sampling. As we saw in the introduction, to
increase the probability that a sample is representative of the population it stems
from, it should be sampled randomly or without any bias.
One could therefore say that probabilistic reasoning refers to situations in
which one has to make predictions about the outcomes of a random process and has
perfect knowledge regarding all the possible outcomes and their respective probabil-
ity. Or in other words, one has knowledge about a population and makes predictions
about samples.
In contrast, one could say that statistical reasoning refers to situations in which
information about populations is not available and in which the only accessible data
comes in the form of samples drawn out of the population. Statistical reasoners
should rely on statistical regularities observed in these samples to make inferences
about populations. They should incorporate the size of the observed samples into
their inferences, as well as the sampling process. They should adjust their inferences
when provided with new data. In other words a statistical reasoner has knowledge
about samples and makes inferences about populations.
Consistent with these definitions, Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Steve Cherry
(2011) wrote in their article entitled: “Elementary Probability and Statistics: A
Primer”:
In short, drawing an inference from a sample to a population is statistics
and drawing an inference from a population to a sample is mathematics
that rests on using the theory of probability. (p.62)
One could also say that the result of statistical reasoning is learning and the result
of probabilistic reasoning is a prediction. Often, both types of reasoning work to-
gether, as one first learns about the probability distribution of a given parameter,
and then uses this knowledge to make new predictions about events in order to
direct decisions. Both statistical and probabilistic reasoning therefore help making
predictions and rational decisions under uncertainty inherent to inductive general-
isations, but only probabilistic reasoning helps making predictions about outcomes
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of random processes.
Is it ever the case, in real life, that one has perfect knowledge about the sample
space of a future event and the probability associated with each possibility or are
real life problems only problems of inferential statistics? It is difficult to provide
a direct answer to this question as one should find examples of real life scenarios
that are treated like probabilistic experiments. However, research on intuitions
about probability can provide an indirect answer. For example, is it not the case in
Téglás et al. (2007) that infants made probabilistic inferences based on the possible
outcomes of a random process? If this had been a statistical problem, infants should
first have learned the probability associated with each option through experience
to be able to make rational predictions. As shown in Experiments 3 and 4 of
Téglás et al. (2007), 5-year-olds did also integrate experienced frequencies into their
predictions, but not 3-year-olds. These findings suggest that infants make inferences
about random processes without any prior knowledge, based on the probability of
each possibility.
Similarly, in Denison and Xu (2014), Rakoczy et al. (2014), Tecwyn et al.
(2017), Clements et al. (2018), it seems that individuals made inferences from pop-
ulations to samples based on an assumption of random drawing. If this had been a
statistical problem, individuals should have updated their priors about the random
sampling based on the outcomes. In fact, individuals in the nonhuman primates
studies should have learnt that the sampling was not random, as the experimenter
always drew an item of the majority type out of each population, but no learning
was observed in any experiment. If we assume that individuals relied on proportions
of objects and on an indication of random drawing to make inferences, we can say
that these predictions were the result of probabilistic reasoning but not of statistical
reasoning. Whether there are real life scenarios similar to probabilistic experiments
is hard to answer but it seems that some primates brains have the ability to deal
with probabilistic experiments.
Experiments in Xu and Garcia (2008), in contrast, are examples of statist-
ical reasoning, if we assume that children relied on proportions of objects to make
inferences about the content of the populations. Findings from Xu and Denison
(2009), Eckert, Rakoczy et al. (2018) and from my second study would be examples
of statistical reasoning and probabilistic reasoning, assuming again that individuals
relied on relative frequencies of objects in the children study, as subjects first learnt
something, either about the sampling process in the two first studies or about the
probability of rewards associated to each option in my study, and then used this
knowledge to make new predictions and rational decisions.
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What are intuitive statistics and Bayesian reasoning? Intuitive statistics should
be a term used to refer to statistical reasoning abilities that have not been acquired
through education, which is the case of studies with young human children, non-
human primates and prenumerate human adults. Bayesian reasoning should more
specifically refer to the ability to update prior beliefs based on evidence following
Bayes’ theorem, as was illustrated in the example of Phillips and Edwards (1966)
mentioned in the introduction. The inferences made by infants in Xu and Garcia
(2008) could be seen as Bayesian reasoning, as infants were first shown two possib-
ilities of populations of objects, and then, based on samples drawn out of a hidden
population, they formed a belief about the possible state of the hidden population.
However, methods of this study did not allow to assess whether infants distinguished
between the impact of the evidence (i.e., which hypothesis was best supported by
the evidence), and the posterior probability of each hypothesis, as the hypothesis
that was best supported by the evidence was also the hypothesis with the highest
posterior probability (this is always the case when priors are flat). Remember that
in the example of the Green and the Blue cab companies (Bar-Hillel, 1980), it was
ruled out that adults were statistical reasoners because they did not include the base
rate at which each type of car occurred in the city into their calculations. Findings of
Xu and Garcia (2008) are not sufficient to conclude that infants did. There is to my
knowledge no research with infants and nonhuman primates that clearly showed that
infants and nonhuman primates update priors based on evidence following Bayes’
rule.
As we saw in the previous section, different mechanisms might be responsible
for different probability intuitions. To shed more light on the nature and the evolu-
tion of probability intuitions, it therefore seems warranted to name different abilities
differently and to compare performance of animals with tasks that have the same
computational difficulty and that provided the same kind of information.
5.3.2 Considering mental representations
As I already mentioned above, it is hard to tell apart the role played by mental
representations and the role played by probability intuitions in the performance of
subjects in statistical reasoning tasks. One of the prerequisite to engage in statistical
reasoning is the ability to form hypotheses.This is well formulated in a paper from
Tenenbaum et al. (2011):
If the mind goes beyond the data given, another source of information
must make up the difference. Some more abstract background know-
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ledge must generate and delimit the hypotheses learners consider, or
meaningful generalization would be impossible. (p. 1279)
If a reasoner is unable to represent a given probability distribution, a relevant factor
or variable, no hypothesis can be formed and no learning will ensue, irrespective
of whether the reasoner is a statistical reasoner or not. One can represent a factor
or a variable more or less abstractedly, and this in turn can affect one’s ability
to generalise. Take the example of our two agents in Experiment 3 of my second
study, who opened different boxes. As was already mentioned above, representing
the probability distribution of the successes and failures to open the box as different
levels of proficiency can help in memorizing the events over time. Now imagine that
new boxes with different colours and shapes were placed in front of the two humans,
and monkeys had to choose between the two humans, as previously, but without
having seen the humans interact with the new boxes. If long-tailed macaques can
represent the different boxes as being part of a bigger category, such as “objects that
can be opened in similar ways”, and if they can represent the previous successes and
failures of the agents as a constant characteristics of these agents, then they should
be able to generalisee what they learnt in the previous trials to a new context. If
they cannot represent these variables, they would have to go through a new sampling
phase to learn the probabilistic contingencies between human, box and reward in
this new context.
Another way how higher levels of abstractions can enhance statistical reasoning
is by making reasoners more aware of conditional factors (Cheng, 1993). Take again
the example of my first study and similar paradigms. If a reasoner cannot represent
a blind agent sampling items from a box as a random sampling process, she will not
use it as a condition for considering all items in the boxes as having equal probability
of being drawn and will fail in this task, independent of whether she has intuitions
about probabilities or not. The ability to represent some factors as potentially
predictive of events and not others can also limit the number of computations the
brain needs to do in order to find meaningful regularities (Tenenbaum et al., 2011).
Imagine that long-tailed macaques in our experiments also considered the table on
which the objects were placed, the side on which they were placed, the order in
which objects were presented, etc. as potential factors affecting the probability to
obtain a reward. In some trials, some of these factors would covary with the higher
frequency of rewards, monkeys would therefore need more trials and more time to
rule these factors out as potential predictors. A task that is easy for some animals
can be hard for others.
Statistical reasoning might be content-free in the sense that it uses probability
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distributions as input information, and probability distributions can be derived from
any repetition of types of events and from any proportion of objects over space and
time. However, whether brains can derive these probability distributions in the first
place might depend on the available mental representations. To shed more light on
the evolution of statistical reasoning, it seems therefore important to investigate how
different mental representations can influence inferences. What sets humans apart
from other species might be their ability to compute more complex probabilities,
but it might also be the presence in their brains of more abstract representations of
the world. Both factors might be at the origin of human’s larger-scale systems of
knowledge (Tenenbaum et al., 2011).
5.4 Conclusion
In summary, the findings from my first two studies, in conjunction with findings
from studies on other animals, suggest that intuitions about probabilities are older
than the Hominidae family. Different species of primates and birds seem to share
similar probability intuitions. However, different cognitive mechanisms might be at
the origins of intuitions about probabilities. One mechanism might be responsible
for making inferences about never-experienced events and to use statistical inform-
ation extracted from the present state of the environment as input information.
The other mechanism might rely on experienced frequencies and to use statistical
information extracted from past events. The fact that long-tailed macaques failed
at making inferences from populations to samples but made rational decisions when
they could extract statistical information from repeated types of events suggests
that reasoning about experienced events might be evolutionary older than reasoning
about never-experienced outcomes. The findings from my third study confirm that
preschoolers do not rely on proportions to make predictions from populations to
samples, and further suggest that infants’ abilities might have been overestimated
and that proportional reasoning only develops around 5 years of age. However, this
conclusion has to be treated carefully, as other factors might have impaired infants’
performance. In the future, it would be interesting to classify the different tasks
used to test probability intuitions into different categories, depending on their com-
putational difficulty, on the mental representation a reasoner needs to solve these
tasks, and the type of information provided. Such a classification could foster bet-
ter comparisons between performances of animals or of different ages groups and
better inform the evolutionary origins and developmental trajectory of statistical
reasoning.
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Figure S1. Objects used as rewards during the study. a) Children were presented with 
white and blue Kinder egg capsules. On the blue eggs were also displayed cartoon eyes. 
b) All blue eggs contained a fingerpuppet, all white eggs were empty. c) Different 
fingerpuppets used during the study.  
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